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The structure of sovereign debt has evolved over time from illiquid bank loans toward liquid bonds
that are traded on the secondary market in the past two decades. This change in the debt structure
is accompanied with a reduction in the duration of sovereign debt renegotiation; it takes on average 9
years to restructure bank loans, but only 1 year to restructure bonds. In this work, we argue that the
secondary market plays an important role | information revelation | in reducing the renegotiation
length. We construct a dynamic bargaining game between the government and the creditors with private
information on the creditors' reservation value. The government uses costly delays as a screening device
for the creditors' type, and so the delays arise in equilibrium. Moreover, the more severe is the private
information, the longer the delays are. When we introduce the secondary market, the equilibrium delays
are greatly reduced. This is because the secondary market price conveys information about the creditors'
reservation and lessens the information friction. We also nd that bond nancing is more friendly to the
debtor country; it increases ex-ante borrowing and investment and ex-post renegotiation welfare of the
government.
JEL: F02, F34, F51




The structure of sovereign debt of developing countries has evolved over time from illiquid bank loans to liquid
bonds. Before 1990, sovereign countries borrow mainly from commercial banks in the form of syndicated
bank loans, which are often customized to the government needs and rarely traded. After 1990, sovereign
countries start to borrow mainly in the form of sovereign bonds, which are highly standardized and liquid
on the secondary market. This change in the sovereign debt structure is accompanied with a reduction in
the renegotiation length. Restructuring of bank loans is prolonged, taking on average 9 years. In early
1990s, even longer renegotiations were expected when governments start to borrow in terms of bonds from a
large number of diused creditors. In reality, however, it takes only 1 year on average to restructure bonds
defaulted upon after 1990.
It is of policy relevance to understand why bond debt has shorter delays than bank debt. Delays are
inecient: the government suers from losing access to international nancial markets and the creditors
cannot realize investment gains. It has been widely argued that faster debt restructuring would have helped
major borrowing countries recover from crisis and restore the momentum of growth at an earlier stage. It
is also theoretically relevant to understand ex-post renegotiation outcomes of bank debt and bond debt.
Dierent renegotiation outcomes have direct implications on ex-ante borrowing and default incentives of the
government for bank debt and bond debt.
In this paper, we argue that the secondary market plays an important role | information revelation
| in reducing the renegotiation length. One important reason for inecient equilibrium delays is private
information. When the creditors' reservation value is private information, the government uses costly delays
as a screening device for the creditors' type, and delays optimally arise in equilibrium. Moreover, the more
severe is the private information, the longer the delays are. When we introduce the secondary market, the
secondary market price conveys information about the creditors' reservation and lessens the information
friction. As a result, the equilibrium delays are greatly reduced.
We model the renegotiation of illiquid bank loans by adopting the dynamic bargaining game with private
information in Fudenberg et al. (1985). A government defaults on its debt and negotiates with creditors
over a new debt contract. Both parties discount the future at the same rate. During the renegotiation, the
government suers a loss in output, and the creditors can seize a fraction of the output loss, which forms
their reservation value. The reservation value is private information of the creditors, and the government is
informed only about its distribution. In each renegotiation period, the government makes a debt restructuring
proposal, and the creditors either accept or reject the proposal. If the creditors accept, the government repays
the creditors the proposed oer and avoids the output loss. Otherwise, the renegotiation continues to the
next period.
Private information is key to generating delays in equilibrium. Without private information, the renego-
1tiation has no delay: the government proposes the reservation value and the creditors accept immediately.
Thus, the government captures all the surplus. With private information, the government needs to pro-
pose the highest possible reservation to avoid delays. In this case, the government obtains the least surplus
possible. Thus, delays might increase his surplus. A lower oer reduces the probability of acceptance, but
increases the surplus when the creditors in fact have low reservation and accept the oer. Thus, the costly
delays arise in equilibrium as a screening device of the creditors' reservation.
In the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the renegotiation always ends in nite periods. The key
assumption is that the creditors cannot seize all the output loss. This implies that the government obtains a
positive sure payo if he proposes the highest possible reservation to end the renegotiation immediately. As
time goes by, the potential surplus from further screening the creditors becomes insignicant relative to the
sure payo, and so the government wants to end the renegotiation immediately. More importantly, when the
information friction is more severe, the gains from delays are higher and the maximum renegotiation length
are longer.
To model the renegotiation of liquid bonds, we introduce into the basic framework the secondary market
trading, following Grossman and Stiglitz (1976). The government defaults on bonds, which are equally
held by all creditors. The distribution of the creditors' reservation value is public information. Before the
secondary market opens, each creditor receives a signal about their common reservation value. According to
their signals, the creditors decide whether to buy one additional unit of bond, to sell or to hold their bond on
the secondary market. Some random fraction of the creditors turn out to be noisy trader and sell regardless
of their signals. The market price is public information. After the secondary market trading, the creditors
with bonds observe their reservation value, and the renegotiation process starts and is the same as before.
We nd that the renegotiation length is much shorter with the secondary market. This is because the
secondary market price conveys information about the creditors' reservation value. The price is informative
because it aggregates the signals that the creditors receive based on the true reservation and according to
which they trade. The government updates his belief about the distribution of the reservation value of the
creditors using the market price. Thus, the government has more precise information about the reservation
value, which reduces the delays in renegotiation.
We also analyze the impacts of the secondary markets on the renegotiation welfare of the creditors and
the government and on ex-ante borrowing and investment incentives of the government. The reduction
in the renegotiation length increases the total surplus. At the same time, the government gains more
bargaining power and derives higher payos from the renegotiation. Thus, the renegotiation outcomes of
bond nancing is more friendly to the debtor country than to the creditors. Furthermore, the delays in the
ex-post renegotiation reduce the ex-ante borrowing and investment incentives of the government. Thus, bond
nancing also improves eciency in borrowing and investment through its reduction in the renegotiation
2length.
Our work relates to a large theoretical literature on sovereign debt renegotiation. Bulow and Rogo
(1989), Fernandez and Rosenthal (1990), Kletzer (2003), and Yue (2006), assumes complete information and
generates no delays in reaching agreements. Two recent works, Benjamin and Wright (2008) and Bi (2008),
analyze the impact of uncertainty on the renegotiation length.1 Complimentary to their studies, our work
focuses on the role of information frictions. Pitchford and Wright (2007) examine delays arising from \free
riding" and \hold out" among the creditors. Haldane et al. (2005) show that to a large extent Collective
Action Clauses or Exit Consent clauses can solve the coordination problem among the creditors. We thus
abstract from the coordination problem among the creditors and focus on the coordination problem between
the creditors and the government.
Our work also relates to Bolton and Jeanne (2007), in which the government decides whether to nance
borrowing with bank loans or bond loans taking as given the ex-post restructuring outcomes of either
nancing. In particular, they assume that bond loans are more dicult to restructure than bank loans,
which is at odds with the data. Our work takes the nancing forms as given, and studies their renegotiation
outcomes. We nd that bond loans are associated with shorter negotiation and higher total welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents briey some empirical background for sovereign debt
renegotiation. Section 3 studies the bank loan renegotiation, and Section 4 studies the bond renegotiation.
Section 5 examines the impact of the renegotiation outcomes on ex-ante borrowing and investment decisions.
We conclude in Section 6.
2 Empirical Background
The sovereign debt structure of developing countries has evolved over time from illiquid bank loans to liquid
bonds. Figure 1 plots the share of bank loans and bonds in the public and publicly guaranteed debt from
private creditors for the developing countries. Before 1990, these countries borrow mainly from commercial
banks in advanced economies in terms of syndicated bank loans. The bank loans are customized and rarely
traded. The scale of sovereign bonds is minimal. Under the Brady plan (an eort to resolve the 1980s
debt crisis), the exchange of commercial bank loans for tradable bonds promoted the development of the
secondary market for developing country bonds in the early 1990s. This development sparked a burst of
bond issuance by the developing countries. In the 1990s, bonds become the dominant form of private lending
to the developing countries.
Sovereign debt renegotiation is usually lengthy. More importantly, the change in the sovereign debt
structure is accompanied with a reduction in the renegotiation length. We categorize sovereign defaults
on private creditors since 1975 into two groups: bank debt and bond debt. Table 5 reports the summary
1Delays arise because both the debtor and the creditors prefer to settle under a good future shock to split a bigger \pie".






















Data Source: World Bank's Global Development Finance Database.
statistics on the renegotiation length for each group.2 The renegotiation process for bank loans is very
lengthy, taking on average about 9 years. In contrast, the renegotiation process for bonds is much faster,
taking on average about 1 year.
Table 1: Duration of Sovereign Debt Renegotiation, Years
Mean Median Std Maximum Minimum Episodes
All default episodes since 1975
Bank debt 9.09 7.90 6.00 24.00 0.70 68
Bond debt 1.21 1.10 1.33 4.00 0.00 15
All default episodes since 1990
Bank debt 4.65 4.70 3.04 12.00 0.70 23
Bond debt 1.21 1.10 1.33 4.00 0.00 15
Data Source: Benjamin and Wright (2008) and Standard & Poor's.
Furthermore, the renegotiation length is still shorter for bonds than for bank loans when we examine two
subsamples. We rst restrict the sample to the defaults that occur after 1990 since all defaults on the bond
debt occur after 1990. As shown in Table 5, the average renegotiation length of bond loans becomes smaller,
4.65 years, but is still longer than that of bonds, 1.29 years. We then examine the sample of countries
which have defaulted on both bank debt and bond debt. The results are reported in Table 2. For all these
countries, the bond renegotiation is shorter than the bank loan renegotiation.
To understand the duration of sovereign debt renegotiation, we describe briey empirical renegotiation
2For details see Data Appendix.
4Table 2: Duration of Debt Renegotiation for Selected Countries, Years
Country Length Country Length
Bank Debt Bond Debt Bank Debt Bond Debt
Argentina 11.2 3.6 Paraguay 7.6 1.4
Ecuador 12.3 1.4 Russia 6.0 2.3
Ivory Coast 15.2 4.0 Uruguay 1.1 0.0
Nigeria 10.4 0.0 Venezuela 1.0 0.7
processes.3 For bank loans, the negotiation starts with the debtor country to mandate a leading bank to
organize a Bank Advisory Committee (BAC), which usually has representatives from major banks on board.4
The debtor country then submits a proposal for the restructuring terms it would like to obtain. The BAC
sends an economic subcommittee to the debtor country. After thoroughly researching on the debt country's
repayment capacity, the economic subcommittee submits a report, based on which the BAC decides whether
to accept or reject the debtor country's oer. If the oer is rejected, the debtor country needs to revise the
proposal. This process repeats until both parties reach an agreement. Next, the BAC sends the agreement to
all participating banks. If a critical mass of creditors respond positively (more than 95% of the outstanding
debt), the deal is nalized. This workout process for resolving debt default is also labeled as the London
Club.
The renegotiation process for bonds is similar. The bond holders organize a committee, which conducts
research on the debtor and facilitates the negotiation. The debtor government proposes a restructuring plan
and all the bond holders vote on it. If a critical mass of the bond holders approve, the proposal is passed
and nalized. Otherwise, the government has to revise the proposal until it passes. Bonds issued under
the english law include the Collective Action clauses allowing supmajority of the bond holders to change
the terms of payment and to make the new terms binding on the minority. Bonds issued under the New
York law typically require unanimous consent to make similar changes. In practice, however, these bonds
often include the Exit Consent clauses allowing majority of creditors to change non-nancial terms of the
old bonds. For example, dropping the waiver of sovereign immunity, the new bond holders make the old
bonds less liquid. Thus, the relevant critical mass in practice is usually the majority rule.
The above renegotiation processes demonstrate that two potential coordination problems might lead
to delays in reaching agreements. One is the coordination problem between the debtor country and the
creditors. The other is the coordination problem among the creditors. Empirically, the second coordination
problem is less severe. In the renegotiation of bank loans, major creditors are already in the BAC, and the
small holdouts can be resolved by either servicing them on the original schedule or buying them back. In
the renegotiation of bonds, the Collective Action clauses or the Exit Consent clauses in the bond contracts
3For an excellent description of sovereign debt renegotiation, see Rieel (2003).
4For eciency consideration, the number of members is usually kept small, seldom higher than 15.
5resolves most of individual holdup problems.5 Thus, we focus on the coordination problem between the
debtor country and the creditors in this work.
The information friction is one of the most important causes for the coordination problem between the
debtor country and the creditors. The debtor country might have private information about its repayment
capacity. The creditors might have private information about their willingness and tolerance of a debt reduc-
tion. The information problem at the debtor country side is solved to a large extent by the comprehensive
analysis provided by the IMF and the BAC or the bond holders' association. The private information on
the creditors' side, however, might be severe enough to cause the lengthy renegotiation. Thus, we focus on
the private information on the creditors' side.
3 Renegotiation of Bank Loans
Syndicated bank loans from commercial banks are the dominant form of private lending to developing
countries before 1990. These bank loans are rarely traded and dicult to restructure: the renegotiation
takes on average about 9 years. We model the renegotiation of bank loans with a dynamic non-cooperative
bargaining game with one-sided incomplete information as Fudenberg et al. (1985). To highlight mechanisms
aecting the renegotiation outcomes, we focus on the ex-post renegotiation in Section 3 and 4, and study
the ex-ante sovereign borrowing and default decisions in Section 5.
3.1 The Model
There are two parties in the model: the bank (the creditor) and the government (the debtor). At date 0, the
government defaults on its bank debt and starts to negotiate with the bank. Assume that the government
has a deterministic output process: yt = y for any t. In each period, the government proposes a restructuring
plan that species a per period payment b to the bank. The bank either accepts or rejects the proposal.
If the proposal is accepted, the renegotiation ends: the government has a per period payo y   b, and the
creditor has a per period payo b. Otherwise, the government loses its output by a fraction ,6 and the bank
can capture a fraction s of the output loss.7 The renegotiation continues to the next period until the two
parties reach an agreement.
Both parties have a discount factor  < 1 and maximize the expected payo. The government obtains
per-period payo (1   )y regardless of whether the proposal is accepted, and negotiates with the bank to
split per-period payo y. Clearly, the government never makes an oer larger than y. Moreover, the
5For the bond structuring of Pakistan, Ukraine, Ecuador, Russia and Uruguay, over 90% of the creditors accept the debtor's
initial oer, and the deal goes through in less than 1 year. The theoretical work of Haldane et al. (2005) shows that the
Collective Action clauses solve the coordination problem among the creditors.
6This loss in output could come from various channels: lose access to nancial markets, lose trade credits, or disruption of
the domestic nancial systems.
7Following Bulow and Rogo (1989), we assume that the bank seizes some payo during the renegotiation to capture the
idea that rms in the debtor country have to pay the bank higher fees to obtain trade credits or conduct transactions while the
government is in arrears on its bank debt.
6bank never accepts an oer lower than sy, and we interpret s as the reservation value of the bank in the
renegotiation. Without loss of generality, we subtract the government per-period payo by (1   )y.
We assume that the bank has private information about s, and the government observes only its dis-
tribution: s is uniformly distributed on [sl;sh] 2 [0;1). The information asymmetry can be understood as
follows. The bank obtains sucient information about the government before making the loans and while
monitoring the loans. The government, however, has little information about the reservation value of the
bank.
In each period t, the information set of the government is a history of rejected oers ht = fb1;b2;:::;bt 1g,
and the information set of the bank is the same history concatenated with the current oer (ht;bt). A system
of beliefs for the government is a mapping from his information set into a probability distribution gt over
s (let Gt denote the cumulative distribution). The government's strategy maps his belief gt into an oer
bt. The bank's strategy maps his information set into either rejection or acceptance. We dene a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium as follows.
Denition 1. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a system of beliefs for the government, and a pair of
strategies for the government and the bank, such that the government's beliefs are consistent with Bayes'
rule (whenever is is applicable) and the strategies of the government and the bank are optimal after any
history given the current beliefs.
To characterize any equilibrium, we need to derive the government's belief gt+1 about the bank's reservation
under any history of the rejected oers ht = fbjgt
j=1. Given the government strategy, the bank rejects oer
bj if and only if his reservation value above is sj. This is because a bank with higher reservation derives
a higher payo from rejecting the oer, but derives the same payo from accepting the oer. Therefore,
the government's posterior belief at date t + 1 is a uniform distribution on interval [s;sh], where s is the
highest cuto reservation among fsjgt
j=1. That is, the belief is truncated from below each period if the oer
is rejected. Thus, we characterize the government posterior belief with one number s.
Dynamic bargaining games with one-sided incomplete information typically have a plethora of equilibria
mainly because a perfect Bayesian equilibrium imposes no restrictions on the uninformed party's beliefs
following out-of-equilibrium moves.8 In our bargaining game, however, there exists a unique perfect Bayesian
equilibrium. The key assumption is sh < 1, which implies that the government obtains a sure payo (1 sh)y
by ending the renegotiation right way with oer shy. The potential surplus that the government might
hope to extract (1   s)y eventually becomes insignicant compared to the sure payo. Thus, the game
always ends in nite periods, which guarantees the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium. We
summarize these results in Proposition 1.
8See Ausubel et al. (2002) for a detailed discussion.
7Proposition 1. If sh < 1, there exists a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium and the renegotiation ends in
nite period T.
Proof: See Fudenberg et al. (1985).
The government has incentives to reach an agreement with the bank as soon as possible to avoid the
output drop and discounting of payos. If there is no private information, the agreement is reached in the rst
period in this deterministic environment: the government oers b = sy per period and captures the entire
surplus from the renegotiation. Thus, a crucial feature of the renegotiation is missed: equilibrium delays in
agreements. With private information, the model generates equilibrium delays because the government does
not want to make a proposal too high in early stages of the renegotiation to miss the likelihood that the
bank has a small reservation value.
In the bargaining game, we assume that the government makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer to the bank
each period. Allowing the bank to make an oer will greatly complicate the bargaining game, because the
signaling mechanism adds to the complexity when the informed party makes the oers. The game will in
general have multiple (or a continuum of) equilibria. Here we deliver the essences of bargaining without
invoking this complication.
3.2 Characterization of Equilibrium
The unique equilibrium is characterized inductively. We start by solving the last period game, in which we
impose that the government must oer shy to end the renegotiation. In fact, whenever the government's
belief about the bank's reservation value becomes high enough, the government is willing to oer shy. We
then work backward on the number of periods remaining and the government's belief simultaneously until
the government's belief is equal to or below sl. By doing so, we can construct the strategies of both the
government and the bank. The equilibrium outcome can be derived accordingly.
We now provide some details of this characterization. Let's start with the last period t = T. The
government proposes B
T(s) = shy for any s to end the renegotiation right way. The per-period payo of
the government is V 
T (s) = (1   sh)y, and the per-period payo of the bank with reservation s is shy.
We next proceed backward until the rst period. In any period t < T, consider an oer bt. The per-
period payo of the bank with reservation s is bt if she accepts today, and (1   )sy + B
t+1(St+1(bt)) if
she accepts tomorrow, where St+1(bt) gives the government's update on the lowest reservation value if the
oer bt is rejected. The bank decides whether to accept or to reject to maximize his payo. In particular, the
bank with reservation St+1(bt) is indierent between accepting today or tomorrow, that is, St+1(bt) solves






8The government then chooses bt to maximize the per-period welfare
Vt(s) = max
bt
t(s;bt)(y   bt) + (1   t(s;bt))V 
t+1(St+1(bt)); (2)
where t(s;bt) denotes the acceptance probability of oer bt, given by (St+1(bt)   s)=(sh   s) under the
uniform distribution. A higher oer will increase the probability of the acceptance, but lower the acceptance
payo of the government. We denote the optimal oer by Bt(s).
We compute the cuto belief ^ st+1, under which the government is indierent between ending the renego-
tiation in period t or after period t, by solving V 
t+1(^ st+1) = Vt(^ st+1). Thus, for any s  ^ st+1, the government
prefers to end the renegotiation after period t, and so we update B
t (s) = B
t+1(s). For any s < ^ st+1, the
government prefers to end the renegotiation in period t with proposals following Bt(s). On the other hand,
the government has to oer at least ^ bt, given by St+1(^ bt) = ^ st+1, to ensure ending the renegotiation within
T   t periods. Thus, we update the government's optimal proposal Bt(s) to B







t+1 if s  ^ st+1
Bt(s) if st < s < ^ st+1
^ bt if s  st
(3)
where st is given by Bt(st) = ^ bt. We also update the government's welfare accordingly and denote it by
V 
t (s). We proceed the above process until we have ^ s1  sl.
Several characteristics of the optimal strategies deserve attentions. First, the government's proposal
(weakly) increases with the belief s. Second, the government's posterior belief increases with the rejected
oer. Third, if the bank has lower reservation, he accepts earlier in the renegotiation.
After deriving the optimal strategies of both the government and the bank, we generate the unique










T 1)) = sh. The bank accepts at date t when
his reservation value falls between ^ st and ^ st+1. Clearly, the higher the reservation value, the longer is the
renegotiation and the higher is the repayment oer.
To illustrate the equilibrium strategies and outcomes transparently, we present a numerical example,
where  = 0:5, [sl;sh] = [0:1;0:9], and y is normalized to one. We plot the optimal strategy of the
government and his belief updates in Figure 2. The solid line presents the optimal proposals of the government
as a function of his belief s. The dashed line shows the government's new belief about s if his oer bt(s) is
rejected. The vertical, dashed lines indicate the period cutos. The maximum renegotiation length in this
case is four periods.
We trace out the equilibrium proposals with blue squares and the equilibrium belief cutos with red
squares in the gure. In period 1, the government proposes b1(sl) = 0:56. If the bank's reservation is below
S2(b1) = 0:4, the proposal is accepted and the renegotiation ends. Otherwise, the bank rejects the oer,
and the government updates his belief to S2(b1). In period 2, the government proposes b2(S2(b1)) = 0:72,
9Figure 2: Government's Optimal Strategy



























which is accepted by the bank with reservation below S3(b2) = 0:6. In period 3, the government proposes
b3(S3(b2)) = 0:81, which is accepted by the bank with reservation below S4(b3) = 0:76. In period 4, the
government proposes b4(S4(b3)) = 0:9, and the renegotiation ends.
3.3 Duration of Bank Loan Renegotiation
Now we study our key interest: duration of the bank loan renegotiation. In particular, we are interested
in how the degree of the information friction impacts the renegotiation length. We nd analytically that
the maximum renegotiation length increases with the degree of the information friction. Also, we nd
numerically that the expected renegotiation length displays an increasing trend as the information friction
rises.





and a higher 	 indicates a higher degree of the information friction. In the proposition below, we demonstrate
that the maximum renegotiation length increases with the degree of the information friction 	. The economic
intuition for this result is the following. 1   sl is the largest possible payo of the government from the
renegotiation, and 1   sh is the sure payo if the government ends the renegotiation right way. A larger 	
means that the maximum potential payo increases relative to the sure payo. Thus, the government has
more incentives to use the costly equilibrium delays to screen the bank's reservation.
Proposition 2. The maximum renegotiation length increases with the degree of the information friction 	.
10Proof: See Technical Appendix.
Following Proposition 2, we can immediately show that the maximum renegotiation length increases as
sh decreases or sl increases. Moreover, we can also easily show that the maximum renegotiation length
increases if the interval of the potential reservation values shifts to the right.9 This is because the degree of
the information friction 	 increases as the interval [sl;sh] shifts to the right to [sl + h;sh + h] with h > 0.
We next look at the expected renegotiation length. For each initial belief [sl;sh], we have a sequence
of the government's oers fb1;b2;:::;bTg and a sequence of the belief updates fs1;s2;:::;sT;sT+1g, where






where Pt denotes the probability of the renegotiation ending in period t, and is given by (st+1   st)=(sh   sl).
Due to complexity of the solution, we characterize the expected renegotiation length numerically. We
set  = 0:98 and y = 1, and explore how the expected renegotiation length varies with the information
friction 	. The results are illustrated in Figure 3. As 	 increases, the expected renegotiation length displays
an upward trend. That is, as the information friction becomes more severe, the renegotiation tends to take
longer to settle. The wiggles are driven by discrete time periods. When an increase in 	 does not change
the maximum renegotiation length, P1 increases, while Pt decreases for any other t. Thus, the expected
renegotiation length decreases. When an increase in 	 drives up the maximum renegotiation length, the
expected renegotiation length increases.
Figure 3: Expected Renegotiation Length







































9This result is important when we discuss the renegotiation outcomes for bonds in the next section.
11In sum, we use a classic dynamic bargaining game with incomplete information to model the renegoti-
ation of bank loans. The information friction generates equilibrium delays in reaching agreements in the
renegotiation. Moreover, we nd that the delays become shorter as the information friction decreases. In the
next section, we model the renegotiation of bonds with the secondary market. The secondary market trading
serves an important role in reducing the information frictions, and thus the delays are greatly shortened.
4 Renegotiation of Bonds
After 1990, bond issuances become the dominant form of sovereign borrowing in developing countries.
Sovereign bonds are standardized, issued to the public and traded on the secondary market. The rene-
gotiation process of bonds is short, taking on average about one year, compared to 9 years for structuring
bank loans. We argue that the secondary market plays an important information-revelation role in reducing
the renegotiation length. In this section, we model the renegotiation between the government and a contin-
uum of bond holders with the presence of the secondary market. We design the model as close as possible
to the one of bank loans, while incorporating the secondary market. This way we can highlight the role of
the secondary market on the renegotiation outcomes for bonds.
4.1 The Model with the Secondary Market
There are two types of agents in the economy: a sovereign government and a continuum of creditors of
measure one. For simplicity, we assume all the creditors hold one unit of bonds. After the government
announces default at date 0, the secondary market opens and the creditors trade at the market price p.
In the trading stage, the government and the creditors know that creditors' reservation s is drawn from a
uniform distribution [sl;sh]. Each creditor receives a signal z about s, where z = s + z" with " uniformly
distributed on [ 1;1]. In date 1, the creditors with bonds observe their common reservation value s and
negotiate with the government. The renegotiation follows the same process as that for bank loans. All the
agents have the same discount factor  and maximize the expected payo.
Each creditor can hold on to the bond or trade on the secondary market: either selling or buying one
unit of bonds.10 The payo of selling is the market price p. The payo of holding or buying depends on the
expected payo from the renegotiation. Conditional on his private signal z and the public information p,
the creditor calculates the expected payo and makes the trading decision.
A random fraction  of the creditors are noisy creditors; they sell their bonds regardless of their signals.




10The assumption on the upper bound of trading makes our analytics simple and transparent, and it is not essential for our
main ndings.
12where  is a random variable and uniformly distributed on [0;1], and 0 <  < 1. A higher  implies a
larger measure of noisy creditors. Nonetheless, the measure of the noisy creditors is less than that of the
non-noisy creditors.
At period 1, the reservation value s is revealed to all the creditors with bonds, but not to the government.
The government starts the renegotiation and proposes a per-period repayment plan bt in each period t. Every
creditor either accepts or rejects the oer. If a critical fraction  of the creditors accept, the bargaining
process ends: the government has a per period payo y   b, and each creditor has a per-period payo b. If
a less-than- fraction of creditors accept, the agreement is not reached and the bargaining continues to the
next period: the government loses a  fraction of its output, and the creditors capture a fraction s of the
output loss.
In the model, we could vary  to capture any critical mass. Our model results, however, are independent
of . This is because all the creditors are ex-post identical with the same reservation s and they either
all accept or all reject. We abstract from the coordination problem between creditors, such as free-riding
in renegotiation costs and strategic hold-outs due to two reasons. One is that we want to focus on the
coordination problem between the debtor country and the creditors. The other is that the coordination
problem is less relevant with the Collective Action clauses or the Exit Consent clauses as shown in Shin et
al 200X.
We restrict the trading strategy of the creditors to be monotonic: the creditor buys whenever his signal
z is more than ^ z(p) and vice versa. We dene the monotonic perfect Bayesian equilibrium below.
Denition 2. A monotonic perfect Bayesian equilibrium consists of a market price p, beliefs of the gov-
ernment as a function of p, beliefs of the creditors as a function of p and signal z, and a monotonic trading
strategy of the creditors ^ z(p) in the trading stage, and a pair of strategies for the government and the
creditors and a system of beliefs for the government in the renegotiation stage, such that
 In the renegotiation stage, the government's beliefs are consistent with Bayes' rule (whenever is appli-
cable) and the strategies of the government and the creditors are optimal after any history given the
current beliefs.
 In the trading stage, the monotonic trading strategy is optimal for all creditors given their beliefs,
updated using the market price p and private signals z. The government also updates his belief using
the market price p.
 The secondary markets clear at price p.
134.2 Equilibrium with the Secondary Market
Trading on the secondary market inuences sovereign debt renegotiation outcomes. Without the secondary
market, the renegotiation outcomes of bond restructuring are the same as those of bank loan restructuring.
With the secondary market, the government updates his belief about the reservation value of the creditors
using the observed secondary market price. The price is informative because it aggregates the signals
according to which the creditors trade. We now describe the information revelation mechanism of the
secondary market.
According to the creditors' monotonic trading strategy ^ z(p), the excess demand of non-noisy creditors
X(s;p) is given by
X(s;p) = (1   )[P (z > ^ z (p)js)   P (z  ^ z(p)js)]; (7)
where P (z > ^ z(p)js) denotes the probability of signals above ^ z(p), i.e., the amount of bonds demanded, and
P (z  ^ z(p)js) the amount of bonds supplied. Since z is uniformly distributed on [s   z;s + z], simple
algebra delivers
X(s;p) = (1   )
s   ^ z(p)
z
: (8)
The bond supply from the noisy creditors is the fraction of the noisy creditors 0 <  < 1. From the market
clearing condition, in equilibrium we have







s = ^ z(p) + z: (10)
Therefore, the government infers that s is uniformly distributed on [^ z(p); ^ z(p)+z], when observing the




l = maxf^ z(p);slg and sG
h = minf^ z(p) + z;shg. The government then forms his renegotiation
strategy accordingly, as discussed in the previous section.
The creditors also use the market price to form their expected payo from the renegotiation and make the
trading decisions. When observing p, the creditors know that in the renegotiation stage the government will
propose according to his new prior updated with ^ z(p). The creditors compute the payo WN(s; ^ z(p)) for each
reservation value s. His belief about s is updated using his signal z on the government's belief based on the
public signal. The expected renegotiation payo is thus given by Es

WN(s; ^ z(p))j^ z(p);z

.11 The payo to
sell is p, the payo to hold is Es

WN(s; ^ z(p))j^ z(p);z

, and the payo to buy is  p+2Es

WN(s; ^ z(p))j^ z(p);z

.
Clearly, holding is always weakly dominated by either selling or buying.
11We assume that the trading stage is so short that there is no discounting for the renegotiation payo. The only purpose of
this assumption is for conveniency when we compare welfare across the two games.
14In the monotone trading strategy, the creditor with the cuto signal must be indierent between buying




WN(s; ^ z(p))j^ z(p); ^ z(p)

: (11)
For the monotone trading strategy to be optimal, we also need that the creditors with higher signals (weakly)
prefer buying to selling, and vice versa. Specically, we need that any creditor with signal z > ^ z(p) prefers
to buy if and only if
p  Es

WN(s; ^ z(p))j^ z(p);z

: (12)
This condition holds because WN (s; ^ z(p)) is (weakly) increasing in s and a higher signal z implies that s is
likely to be higher.
For each realization of (s;), there is a unique pair of (^ z;p), which characterizes the monotonic perfect
Bayesian equilibrium. Specically, there is a unique cuto signal ^ z that clears the market by solving equation
(10), and the market price equals to the expected payo of the critical creditor by solving equation (11).
Given the cuto signal ^ z, the government's and the creditors' renegotiation strategies is uniquely pinned
down. This implies that there is a unique value of the expected payo of the critical creditor, and so a unique
market price p. Thus, the monotonic perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists and is unique. We summarize this
result in the following proposition.
Proposition 3: There exists a unique monotonic perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Proof: See Technical Appendix.
The secondary market price plays an important role in determining the equilibrium delays. The govern-
ment uses the price to update his belief about the creditors' reservation and form the renegotiation strategies.
We illustrate the relation between the secondary market price and the expected renegotiation length numer-
ically in Figure 4 with the benchmark parameters set as y = 1, [sl;sh] = [0;0:99],  = 0:98, z = 0:5, and
 = 0:5. We nd that overall a higher price is associated with longer renegotiation. An increase in p tends
to increase the cuto signal ^ z, shifting the set of potential reservation values to the right. This implies an
increase in the degree of the information friction 	. As a result, the maximum renegotiation length increases
with the secondary market price, according to Proposition 2. The expected renegotiation length displays a
similar pattern.
4.3 Information Revelation of Secondary Market
To highlight the role of the secondary market, we compare the duration of the bond renegotiation with that
of the bank loan renegotiation. We rst show analytically that the secondary market reduces the equilibrium
15Figure 4: Market Price and Expected Renegotiation Length



































delays in reaching agreements. In particular, when there is no noisy trader, the secondary market price is
perfectly revealing and there is no equilibrium delay. We then illustrate numerically the quantitative impacts
of the secondary market on the renegotiation length.
The maximum duration of the bond renegotiation is (at least weakly) shorter than that of the bank loan
renegotiation. The key to this result is that as long as the secondary market price is somewhat informative,
the government will form an updated belief [sG
l ;sG
h ] about the creditor's reservation value s. The new
belief [sG
l ;sG
h ] is a subset of the ex-ante belief [sl;sh]. Thus, the information friction 	 decreases with the
secondary market. As a result, the maximum renegotiation length under the new belief is shortened, as
shown in Proposition 2. We summarize this nding in the following proposition.
Proposition 4: The maximum renegotiation length of the bond renegotiation is always shorter than or equal
to that of the bank loan renegotiation.
Proof: See Technical Appendix.
Now consider the extreme case that the secondary market is perfect with no noise. The market price p then
perfectly reveals the reservation value s. The government proposes b1 = sy and the creditors accept at date
1. This is because the government makes all the proposals and the creditors have no bargaining power. In
this case, the renegotiation outcomes are ecient: no equilibrium delays in reaching agreements and no loss
in the total surplus. These ndings are summarized in Proposition 5 below.
Proposition 5: If  = 0, the government updates his belief s to be ^ z(p) and proposes sy each period, and
the creditors accept the oer in period 1.
16Proof: See Technical Appendix.
We next compare the expected duration of the bond renegotiation with that of the bank loan renegotiation
quantitatively. Consider the benchmark parameter values: y = 1, [sl;sh] = [0;0:99],  = 0:98, z = 0:5, and
 = 0:5. The expected renegotiation length for bank loans is 9:1; the secondary market trading reduces it to
1:18. The duration of the bond renegotiation depends on the noises on the secondary market: z and . We
vary rst z and then  while keeping all the other parameters xed, and report the expected renegotiation
length under column Te in Table 3. We note that the expected length of the bond renegotiation is always
shorter than that of the bank loan renegotiation. Moreover, as the information becomes more precise, i.e.
as z or  decreases, the duration of the bond renegotiation becomes shorter.












0.10 1.03 1.00 0.52 0.48 0.10 1.03 1.00 0.52 0.48
0.50 1.83 1.00 0.61 0.39 0.50 1.83 1.00 0.61 0.39
0.90 2.92 1.00 0.68 0.32 0.70 2.36 1.00 0.64 0.35
3.00 7.04 0.98 0.81 0.16 0.90 2.92 1.00 0.68 0.32
4.4 Welfare Analysis
We now study the welfare implications of the bank loan renegotiation and the bond renegotiation. In
particular, we are interested in how the secondary market aects the total welfare and the allocation of the
welfare across the government and the creditors. The welfare analysis has important policy relevance. It
helps us evaluate which form of sovereign borrowing increases the total surplus, and which form is friendly
to the debtor country or to the creditors. Answers to these questions are fundamental for reforming the
sovereign debt restructuring framework.
In both models of sovereign debt renegotiation, the government and the creditors bargain over the ex-ante








where Pt is the probability of the renegotiation ending in period t. The expected surplus of the creditors,














where the rst term is the expected repayment from the government and the second term is the expected
payo during the renegotiation. We denote the share of the government expected surplus in the ex-ante
surplus by wg and the share of the creditors' expected surplus by wc.
17We rst study the total expected surplus wc + wg. When there is no equilibrium delay, there is no
loss in the ex-ante surplus, i.e., wc + wg = 1. Otherwise, some ex-ante surplus is lost during the lengthy
renegotiation: wc+wg < 1. Moreover, the longer is the renegotiation, the more total expected surplus is lost.
As a result, the bond renegotiation generates a higher total expected surplus because the duration of the
bond renegotiation is shorter than that of the bank loan renegotiation. Under the benchmark parameters,
the total expected surplus is 0.96 in the bank loan renegotiation, and 1 in the bond renegotiation. Table 3
reports the total expected surplus for the bond renegotiation under dierent noise parameters under column
wc + wg. The more precise is the information, the higher the total surplus is.
We next examine the split of the total surplus between the government and the creditors. The bond
renegotiation generates a lower creditors' share, but a higher government's share of the total expected surplus,
than the bank loan renegotiation. This is because the secondary market reduces the information friction, and
leads to a shift of the bargaining power from the creditors to the government. For the benchmark parameters,
the creditors' share wc is 0:88 under bank loans but only 0.61 under bonds, while the government's share wg
is 0:08 under bank loans, but 0:39 under bonds. Table 3 reports wc and wg for dierent noise parameters
in the bond renegotiation. We nd that a reduction in the information friction leads to a higher wg and a
lower wc.
Therefore, the bond nancing improves the total surplus through reducing the duration of sovereign debt
renegotiation. Moreover, the bond nancing is more friendly to the debtor country because it lessens the
information friction and gives the debtor country more bargaining power. On the contrary, the bank loan
nancing is more friendly to the creditors by allowing them to a higher share of the total surplus.
5 Ex-Ante Borrowing and Lending
We have analyzed the equilibrium outcomes of the renegotiation of dierent forms of sovereign borrowing:
bank loans versus bonds. Understanding these renegotiation outcomes is important for two key reasons.
First, the expected renegotiation outcomes impact directly how the creditors price the debt ex-ante. Second,
these renegotiation outcomes also aect the government's borrowing incentives and default decisions. When
taking these considerations into account, we evaluate the impact of the form of sovereign borrowing on the
total welfare and on the distribution of the welfare between the debtor country and the creditors.
5.1 Model
Consider a sovereign country that borrows to invest in a project in date 0. For an investment level I, the
output of the project is Af(I) per period, where A denotes stochastic productivity of the project. In date
1, A realizes with probability H to be AH and with probability L to be AL, and L + H = 1. The
productivity is constant afterward. The function f is assumed to be f(I) = I. Both the government and
18the creditors have a discount factor  < 1.
We rst examine the optimal investment with no default risk. The optimal investment, equating the
expected return to the risk free rate R, is I =
 
  A=(R(1   ))
 1
1 , where  A denotes the expected produc-
tivity. We refer to I as the ecient investment later.
We then examine the optimal investment with default risk on sovereign borrowing. Before the renegoti-
ation stage, both the government and the creditors are informed of only the distribution of the reservation
value s. The debt contract is specied by a pair (I;b), where I is the resource that the creditors lend to the
government in date 0, and b the amount that the government promises to repay each period from date 1.
The government chooses a debt contract to maximize the expected welfare, HVH(I;b) + LVL(I;b), where
Vj(I;b) denotes the welfare under shock j = H or L. After observing Aj, the government decides whether







; j = L or H;
where V R
j (I;b) denotes the repayment welfare, and V D
j (I;b) the defaulting welfare.
The defaulting welfare V D
j (I;b) is the expected welfare of the government from the renegotiation, since
the government needs to renegotiate with the creditors. The government receives at least (1 )Ajf(I) each
period after default, and splits Ajf(I)=(1   ) with the creditors. Denote the share that the government










The repayment welfare V R
j (b;I) is simply the lifetime discounted value of output Ajf(I) subtracting the









Therefore, the government will default if b  (1   wg)Ajf(I).13 Denote the cuto debt, above which
the government chooses to default under shock j, by bj(I). Thus, we have bH(I) = (1   wg)AHf(I) and
bL(I) = (1   wg)ALf(I), with bH(I) > bL(I) for any I. The government defaults under both shocks for
any contract with b  bH(I), defaults under only the low shock for any contract with b 2 [bL(I);bH(I)], and
defaults under neither shocks for any contract with b  bL(I),
Given the government's default decisions, the creditors design the set of debt contracts oered to the
debtor country to maximize the prot:
max
fI;bg
(I;b) =  R(1   )I + bR
12We show this result in Lemma A.1. of Technical Appendix.
13In this simple ex-ante borrowing game, we abstract from the risk-sharing consideration of default by assuming linear






b if b  bL(I)
Hb + LwcALf(I) if bL(I) < b  bH(I)
wc  Af(I)wc if b > bH(I)
(17)
where wc is the share of Ajf(I)=(1 ) that the creditors expect to obtain from the renegotiation. For b 2
[bL(I);bH(I)], the implicit risk premium depends on the renegotiation outcomes, specically, the creditors'
share of the expected payo wc. When wc increases, i.e., when the creditors expect to obtain a larger share
in the renegotiation, the risk premium goes down, and vice versa. We assume that the creditors face the
Bertrand competition, and the expected prot (I;b) is driven to zero in equilibrium for any contract (I;b).
Let  I1 be the highest investment level such that the government will not default under either shock.  I1

















Assume AL  HAH. It is easy to show that  I2   I1.
We now characterize the equilibrium contracts. The contracts (I;b) oered are given by,
b =
(
R(1   )I if I   I1
(R(1   )I   LwcALf(I))=H if  I1 < I   I2
: (18)
Note that the creditors never oer a contract that the government will default under both shocks. This
is because such contracts generate negative prots. For any contract with I >  I2, it costs the creditors
R(1   )I but only generates wc  Af(I), which is smaller than the cost.
5.2 Optimal Investment and Borrowing
We now analyze the optimal investment and borrowing with default risk. Given the set of the available debt




subject to equation (18). We are interested in the case when the government borrows to the level that he
will default only under the low shock.14 In this case, the optimal investment, denoted by Id, is given by
Id =
( 
(  A   LAL(1   wc   wg))=(R(1   ))
 1
1  if   (1   wg)
[(HAH(1   wg) + LALwc)=(R(1   ))]
1
1  if  > (1   wg)
: (19)
14The condition needed is (1   wg)AL    A  (1   wg)  A   1, where 1 = (1   )(1   wc   wg)LAL  0.
20The optimal investment with default risk Id depends on the renegotiation outcomes wc and wg. Consider
the rst sub-case where   (1   wg). The optimal investment Id depends only on the sum of wc and wg.
When there are no equilibrium delays in reaching agreements, there is no loss in the total surplus, i.e., the
sum of wc and wg is one. As a result, the optimal investment with default risk Id is the same as the ecient
investment without default risk I. When there are equilibrium delays, however, the sum of wc and wg is
less than one. Consequently, the optimal investment Id is lower than the ecient investment I.
For the sub-case where (1 wg) < , the optimal investment Id depends on the split of the total surplus
between the government and the creditors. In particular, Id increases with the share of the creditors wc,
but decreases with the share of the government wg. Moreover, the optimal investment is alway lower than
the ecient investment I.
The quantitative analysis in the previous section shows that the sum of the total renegotiation surplus
increases when the country switches the form of nancing from bank loans to bonds. At the same time,
the share of the government wg increases, but the share of the creditors wc decreases. If this comparative
analysis falls into the rst sub-case, the optimal investment Id is higher for bond nancing than for bank
loan nancing. Moreover, the bond nancing might help the government achieve the ecient investment
level I. If this comparative analysis falls into the second sub-case, the optimal investment Id is lower for
bond nancing than for bank loan nancing.
6 Conclusion
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22Data Appendix
Debt Composition
World Bank's Global Development Finance database reports the outstanding stock of privately held public
or publicly guaranteed debt (PPG) for the developing countries. The PPG debt is classied into three groups
by the type of creditors: bonds, commercial bank loans, and other private creditors. All series are in U.S.
dollars. The sum of bank loans and bonds accounts for majority of the privately held PPG debt. The share
of the PPG debt held by other private creditors is relatively small. In Figure 1, we plot the percentage of
bank loans and bonds as the privately held PPG debt over 1975-2007.
Duration of Sovereign Debt Renegotiation
Benjamin and Wright (2008) collects the starting date, the ending date, and the negotiation length for 90
episodes of sovereign debt restructuring. Nonetheless, there is no information about the form of sovereign
debt in their report. We supplement the form of sovereign debt for each debt restructuring using Standard
& Poor's (2004). Among the 90 episodes reported by Benjamin and Wright, 68 episodes are in the form of
bank loans, and 15 episodes are in the form of bonds. We ignore 7 episodes which are domestic debt. We
summarize the duration of bank loan and bond renegotiations in the tables below separately.
Table 4: Duration of Sovereign Debt Renegotiation, Bond Loans
Country Default Default Length Country Default Default Length
start end (years) start end (years)
Argentina 2001 2005 3.6 Paraguay 2003 2004 1.4
Ecuador 1999 2000 1.7 Russia 1998 2000 2.3
Ecuador 2000 2001 1.1 Ukraine 1998 2000 1.4
Guatemala 1989 1989 0.0 Uruguay 2003 2003 0.0
Ivory Coast 2000 2004 4.0 Venezuela 1995 1997 2.0
Moldova 1998 1998 0.0 Venezuela 1998 1998 0.0
Moldova 2002 2002 0.5 Venezuela 2005 2005 0.1
Nigeria 2002 2002 0.0
23Table 5: Duration of Sovereign Debt Renegotiation, Bank Loans
Country Default Default Length Country Default Default Length
start end (years) start end (years)
Albania 1991 1995 4.6 Mauritania 1992 1996 4.7
Algeria 1991 1996 5.2 Mexico 1982 1990 7.9
Angola 1985 2004 19.0 Morocco 1986 1990 4.6
Argentina 1980 1990 11.2 Mozambique 1983 1992 10.0
Bolivia 1980 1993 12.4 Myanmar 1997 2003 6.0
Brazil 1983 1994 11.2 Nicaragua 1979 2003 24.0
Bulgaria 1990 1994 4.3 Niger 1983 1991 7.9
Burkina Faso 1983 1996 13.0 Nigeria 1982 1992 10.4
Cameroon 1985 2003 18.0 Pakistan 1998 1999 1.6
Cape Verde 1981 1996 15.7 Panama 1983 1996 12.7
Central African Republic 1983 2004 21.0 Paraguay 1986 1993 7.6
Chile 1983 1990 7.4 Peru 1980 1980 0.9
Colombia 1985 1991 5.3 Peru 1983 1997 14.4
Costa Rica 1983 1990 6.7 Philippines 1983 1992 9.6
Croatia 1992 1996 4.0 Poland 1981 1994 12.9
Dominica 2003 2004 1.0 Romania 1981 1983 1.5
Dominican Republic 1983 1994 10.9 Russia 1991 1997 6.0
Ecuador 1982 1995 12.3 Sao Tome and Principle 1987 1994 7.7
Ethiopia 1991 1999 8.1 Senegal 1990 1990 0.7
Gabon 1986 1994 7.4 Senegal 1992 1996 5.0
Gabon 1999 2004 4.7 Serbia and Montenegro 1992 2004 12.0
Gambia 1986 1990 4.2 Seychelles 2000 2002 2.0
Guinea 1986 1988 2.3 Sierra Leone 1986 1995 9.7
Guinea 1991 1998 8.0 South Africa 1993 1993 0.7
GuineaBissau 1983 1996 13.0 Tanzania 1984 2004 20.3
Guyana 1982 2004 21.5 Togo 1991 1997 7.0
Haiti 1982 1994 12.0 Trinidad and Tobago 1988 1989 2.0
Honduras 1981 2004 23.0 Uganda 1980 1993 13.2
Ivory Coast 1983 1998 15.2 Uruguay 1990 1991 1.1
Jamaica 1987 1993 6.1 Venezuela 1990 1990 1.0
Jordan 1989 1993 4.1 Vietnam 1985 1998 14.0
Kenya 1994 2004 10.0 Yemen 1985 2001 16.5
Macedonia 1992 1997 5.2 Zambia 1983 1994 10.5
Madagascar 1981 2002 20.1 Zimbabwe 2000 2004 4.0
24Technical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
To prove Proposition 2, we establish two lemmas. Lemma A.1 shows that the belief, the strategy and the
welfare of the government have the homogeneity property. Lemma A.2 demonstrates that the cuto belief is
a linear function of sh. For conveniency of the proofs, we write the welfare and the optimal strategy of the
government as functions of (1   s;1   sh) instead of (s;sh), and the belief as a function of (1   b;1   sh) .
Lemma A.1. Government's welfare Vt, optimal strategy Bt, and belief function St+1 have the homogeneity
property. Specically, for any  2 (0;1=(1   sh)),
Vt ((1   s);(1   sh)) = Vt (1   s;1   sh) (20)
1   Bt((1   s);(1   sh))=(y) = [1   Bt (1   s;1   sh)=(y)] (21)
1   St+1((1   b);(1   sh)) = 

1   St+1 (1   b;1   sh)

: (22)
Proof: We prove the homogeneity by induction. We rst show that the homogeneity holds for the last two
periods, t = T and T   1. We then prove the homogeneity holds for period n, assuming that it holds for
period n + 1, for any n  T   1.
For the simplicity of the proofs, we normalize the government welfare Vt to ~ Vt, where
~ Vt(1   s;1   sh) = Vt(1   s;1   sh)=(y):
Thus, the government solves the following problem:









1   St+1(b);1   sh

: (23)
The optimal strategy Bt is normalized to ~ Bt accordingly:
~ Bt(1   s;1   sh) = Bt(1   s;1   sh)=(y):
Thus, to prove equation (20) and (21) is equivalent to prove the following two equations, for any  2
(0;1=(1   sh)),
~ Vt((1   s);(1   sh)) = ~ Vt (1   s;1   sh) (24)
1   ~ Bt((1   s);(1   sh)) = 
h
1   ~ Bt (1   s;1   sh)
i
: (25)
In period T, the governmet's strategy is ~ BT(1 s;1 sh) = sh, and his welfare is given by ~ VT(1 s;1 sh) =
1   sh. If the bank rejects proposal b at period T   1, the government updates his belief according to
1   ST(1   b;1   sh) = [(1   b)   (1   sh)]=(1   ). Hence, equation (22), (24) and (25) are satised, i.e.,
the homogeneity holds for period T.
25Given the optimal strategy and the belief in period T, we solve the problem in period T  1. The solutions
for ~ VT 1, ~ BT 1 and ST 1 are as follows:








4(1 s) 4(1 sh) if 2(1   sh) < 1   s  4(1   sh)
(2 )(1 sh)(1 s) (4 3)(1 sh)
2
(1 s) (1 sh) if 1   s > 4(1   sh)




1   sh if 1   s  2(1   sh)
(1   )(1   s)=2 + (1   sh) if 2(1   sh) < 1   s  4(1   sh)
(2   )(1   sh) if 1   s > 4(1   sh)









(1   b)   2(1   sh)

if (2   )(1   sh) < 1   b  1   bT
1
1  ((1   b)   (2   )(1   sh)) if 1   b > 1   bT
where 1   bT = (4   2   2)(1   sh). Clearly, the homogeneity holds for period T   1.
We now assume that equation (22), (24), and (25) hold for period n + 1, and prove that they also hold
for period n. Dene the probability function n as follows:
n(1   s;1   b;1   sh) =
(1   s)  
 
1   Sn+1((1   b);(1   sh))

(1   s)   (1   sh)
:
Clearly, n is homogenous of degree zero in its arguments given the homogeneity property of Sn+1. Using
the homogeneity of ~ Vn+1 and n, we rewrite ~ Vn as, for any  2 (0;1=(1   sh)),
~ Vn(1   s;1   sh) = (1=)max
1 ~ b
fn(1   ~ s;1  ~ b;1   ~ sh)(1  ~ b)
+ (1   n(1   ~ s;1  ~ b;1   ~ sh)) ~ Vn+1(1   Sn+1(1  ~ b;1   ~ sh);1   ~ sh)g;
where 1   ~ sh  (1   sh), 1   ~ s  (1   s), and 1  ~ b  (1   b). Therefore, we have
~ Vn(1   s;1   sh) = (1=) ~ Vn((1   s);(1   sh));
which gives equation (24). The homogeneity of the optimal strategy ~ Bn and the belief function Sn easily
follows. Q.E.D.
Lemma A.2. In any period n, the cuto belief ^ sn is a linear function of sh with a slope depending on the
discount factor , i.e.
1   ^ sn = gn()(1   sh); with gn() > 1: (26)
Proof: Under the belief ^ sn, the government is indierent between ending the game in period n or period












1   ^ sn

:
26This implies that the ratio of (1   sh) and (1   ^ sn) only depends on the underlying parameter . We
summarize this result with 1   ^ sn = gn()(1   sh), and clearly gn() > 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: We need to prove that the maximum negotiation length increases with the
degree of information friction 	. Let's consider two intervals [s1
l;s1
h] with 	1 and [s2
l;s2
h] with 	2. Assume
	1  	2. To compare the maximum renegotiation length, we normalize the interval [s1
l;s1
h] to [~ s1
l;s2
h] with
1   ~ s1
l = (1   s2
h)(1   s1
l)=(1   s1
h). According to the homogeneity properties in Lemma A.1 and Lemma
A.2, interval [s1
l;s1
h] and interval [~ s1
l;s2
h] have the same maximum renegotiation length. It is easy to see
that ~ s1
l  s2





h]. Thus, the maximum negotiation length is shorter under [s1
l;s1
h] than under [s2
l;s2
h]. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3:
We need to prove the uniqueness of the monotonic perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We start by establishing
the monotonicity of the creditors' welfare in Lemma A.3.
Lemma A.3. Given the prior that s is uniformly distributed on [sl;sh], the creditors' welfare increases with
the realization of the reservation value s.




t 1s + T(s) 1 bT(s)
1   
; (27)
where T(s) denotes the period in which the creditors with reservation s accept the oer, given by
T(s) = minft : s  ct+1g;
where ct+1 is the equilibrium belief of the government when his optimal proposal is rejected at period t.
For any s1 and s2 such that s1 < s2 and T(s1) = T(s2), clearly WN(s1)  WN(s2). For any s1 and s2
such that s1 < s2 and T(s1) = T(s2)   1, the dierence between WN(s2) and WN(s2) is
WN(s2)   WN(s1) =
T(s1) 1 X
t=1
t 1(s2   s1) + T(s1) 1s2 + T(s1) 1bT(s1)+1   bT(s1)
1   
: (28)
By the denition of cT(s2), the creditors with reservation cT(s2) are indierent between accepting the period-
T(s1) oer and the period-T(s2) oer. This implies that
bT(s1) = (1   )cT(s2) + bT(s1)+1:
Substituting the above relation into equation (28), we show that
WN(s2)   WN(s1) =
T(s1) 1 X
t=1
t 1(s2   s1) + T(s1) 1(s2   cT(s1)+1):
27Because the creditors with reservation s2 will accept the proposal at period T(s2), we have s2  cT(s2). As a
result, we again prove WN(s1)  WN(s2). Given the generality of T(s1), we essentially proved that WN()
weakly increases in s. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: We prove this proposition in two steps. First, taken the monotonic trading
strategy as given, we show that there exists a unique cuto signal ^ z and a market price p. Given (^ z;p), the
government has the unique optimal strategy and beliefs, and the creditors have the unique optimal strategy
in the negotiation stage. Second, we show that given the optimal strategies and the beliefs in the negotiation
stage, the monotonic trading strategy is optimal for the creditors in the trading stage.
Suppose all the creditors follow the monotonic trading strategy, i.e., selling bonds whenever their signals
below the cuto level ^ z(p). This implies that for each realization of (s;), there exists a unique ^ z(p) that
clears the market, i.e.,
^ z(p) = s   z: (29)
The market price p equals to the expected payo of the critical creditor ^ z(p) by solving equation (11). Given
the cuto signal ^ z(p) and the market price p, the government's and the creditors' negotiation strategies
are uniquely pinned down according to Proposition 1. This implies that the critical creditor has a unique
expected payo, which pins down a unique p.
Next we check whether the monotonic trading strategy is optimal for the creditors at the trading stage.
The expected payo of a creditor with signal z from the negotiation stage is Es[WN(s; ^ z(p))j^ z(p);z].
The creditor will sell if and only if p  Es[WN(s; ^ z(p))j^ z(p);z]. According to Lemma A.3, we have
Es[WN(s; ^ z(p))j^ z(p);z] weakly increases with the signal since a higher signal implies that s is likely to
be higher. Therefore, the monotonic trading strategy is optimal. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4:
After observing the secondary market price p, the government uses the market clearing condition (29) and
updates his belief about s to [sG
l ;sG
h ], where sG
l = maxf^ z(p);slg and sG
h = minf^ z(p) + z;shg. Clearly,
the updated belief [sG
l ;sG
h ] is a subset of the prior belief [sl;sh], since sG
l  sl and sG
h  sh. According to
Proposition 2, both a lower sh and a higher sl shorten the maximum negotiation length. Q.E.D.
28